Time/时间：11月29日（周五）10:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题目：Profiting by bad-mouthing: Employees’ strategic workplace reviews prior to stock option grants
Speaker/报告人： 刘俊岐助理教授
Abstract/摘要：
Using employee-generated workplace reviews posted on Glassdoor.com, we find that rank-and-file employees make value-depressing disclosures about their employers prior to receiving employee stock option grants. The decrease in employees’ ratings is highly transient and associated with an abnormally high volume of reviews, indicating employees’ strategic behavior to lower the strike price of stock options. We also find no evidence that the rating decrease reflects a tension between employees and employers. Such strategic reviews are more prominent in firms with a worse information environment and worse reputation with respect to employee relations, as well as for greater employee stock option awards. Additional analyses show that employees’ strategic disclosure is beyond collusion with executives and increases employers’ costs to recruit new employees. Our results provide novel evidence that employees are able to opportunistically manipulate stock prices through making strategic workplace reviews, which may compromise the incentive effect of employee stock option compensation.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：
刘俊岐，现任厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，博士毕业于法国ESSEC商学院。其研究兴趣主要包括企业强制和自愿信息披露以及信息中介。