Time/时间：12月15日（周五） 上午10:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题目： Enhanced bank monitoring ability and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from public credit registries
Speaker/报告人：陈晓琦助理教授
Abstract/摘要：We examine the impact of enhanced bank monitoring ability on managers’ decisions to voluntarily supply public disclosure. Exploiting the country-level mandatory adoption of public credit registries (PCRs), which are designed to improve banks’ ability to monitor borrowers through sharing borrowers’ credit information among banks, we document a negative impact of enhanced bank monitoring ability on managerial decisions to voluntarily provide management forecasts. This impact is more prominent for PCRs that share more information and have better transparency and regulation, in firms with higher accounting information quality, and in countries where banks are more incentivized to monitor borrowers. Overall, the results provide evidence that enhanced bank monitoring ability facilitates a substitution of shareholder monitoring by bank monitoring, which resolves agency problems in a firm and reduces shareholders’ demand for public disclosure for monitoring purposes.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：陈晓琦，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，硕士生导师。2020年9月博士毕业于香港理工大学会计专业。先后在国内外学术期刊上发表十余篇文章，包括Corporate Governance: An International Review, Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance, Energy Economics, Journal of International Accounting Research, British Accounting Review等。现担任Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance， Corporate Governance: An International Review，Journal of Environmental Management等十余篇期刊的匿名审稿人。