Time/时间：6月2日（周五） 上午10:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题目：Anti-collusion Leniency Laws and Trade Credit Around the World
Speaker/报告人：Daniel Kaiser（Ph.D. (Finance) candidate）
Facilitator/主持人：Professor Lihong Wang
Online Conference ID/腾讯会议号：110-560-733
Abstract/摘要：Without controversy, trade credit is a significant source of financing for firms worldwide. However, recent evidence reveals a stunning dark side of trade credit: suppliers using it as a collusive tool to restrict competition in the market. We reason that suppliers’ collusive use of trade credit limits customers’ trade credit access. Using a sample of cross-country firms and employing the staggered adoption of antitrust laws as evidenced in leniency legislation, we examine how the adoption of this law determines customers’ trade credit access among 66 economies from 1990-2021. Our results show that firms get more access to trade credits after a firm’s home country adopts leniency laws. Moreover, the propensity towards customers’ increased trade access is amplified among firms with higher information asymmetry and financial constraints but less pronounced in countries with stronger formal and informal institutions. Overall, our findings resonate with the view that leniency laws alleviate moral hazards and information asymmetry in the supplier-customer relationship, enhancing firms’ access to trade credits.
Keywords: Anti-collusion leniency laws; trade credits; information asymmetry, agency problems