Time/时间：2020.10.23 10:00-11:30
Venue/地 点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题 目：Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from China
Speaker/报告人：Shaoqing KANG/康少青
Facilitator/主持人：Wenzhou QU/屈文洲
Abstract：
This paper investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders for firms’ tax-avoidance behavior, using a sample of 1,647 Chinese listed firms over the period 2004-2016. Distinguishing between state-controlled and non-state-controlled listed firms, we find that the ownership stake held by the firm’s largest shareholder is negatively associated with tax avoidance in state-controlled firms, whilst positively associated in non-state-controlled firms. The former effect proves particularly strong when the controlling shareholder is a local-level government. Next, other large non-state shareholders negatively affect tax avoidance in state-controlled firms, whereas they positively influence tax-planning practices in non-state-controlled firms. Finally, the differences in institutional quality across regions and over time influence the largest shareholder’s tendency to engage in tax avoidance only in state-controlled firms, with a better institutional environment eliciting more tax avoidance and thus curtailing minority-investor expropriation risk.