Topic: Public Governance, Political Connectedness, and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Presenter：Qingbo Yuan，PhD in accounting, Chinese University of Hong Kong 
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Time: September 26, 2008（Friday）3：00—4：30 PM
Venue: Room 513, Jiageng Bld 2
Chair： Zhe Shen, assistant professor in finance, IFAS
Abstract：
Using a sample of partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in China’s A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO’s political connectedness will affect the listed firms’ hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms cross-listed in overseas stock exchange, in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, and in regions with stronger institutions. As a consequence, political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance. However, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem.
Presenter Introduction：
Dr. Yuan got his M. A. of Accounting from Xiamen University and Ph. D. of Accounting from Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include corporate governance and accounting research inAsiaandChina.
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