Topic: Partial Privatization, Firm Value, and Employment in China: Political and Economic Objectives
Presenter：Takeshi Yamada, Associate Professor of finance, National University of Singapore
Time: May 15, 2009（Friday）3:00—4:30PM
Venue: Room 501, Jiageng Bld 2
Abstract:
This paper examines the incentives of the government to retain control in privatized
state-owned enterprises in China. It shows that the government’s decision to maintain control is influenced by both firm performance and levels of employment. First, our result shows that government prefers to retain major control of privatized firms that have better performance. Second, we find that government at the same time retains control on firms that have greater levels of employment. In contrast to the notion that government sacrifices economic efficiency to achieve political goals, government retains control of better performing firms and pursue political objectives.
Presenter Introduction：
Takeshi Yamada is Associate Professor of finance from National University of Singapore. He got PhD in Finance from University of California at Berkeley and MA and BA in Economics from Keio University. His research interests include Empirical research in financial markets, Funds management and Corporate behaviors with an emphasis in Japanese financial markets.
Download: partial_privatization.pdf