Time：January 5, 2017（Thursday）10:00-11：30
Venue：Room 501, Jiageng Bld 2
Topic：Incentive Contracting with Multiple Directorships
Presenter：Guoyu Lin， PhD student, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract：
An intriguing feature of the outside director market is that a director can simultaneously work for several companies. Theoretically, I find that the relation between incentives and the number of directorships depends on whether the efforts are substitutive or complementary and the magnitude. When efforts are strongly substitutive, the relation between incentives and the number of directorship is negative while this relation becomes positive when efforts are complementary or slightly substitutive. Moreover, the optimal number of directorships is decreasing in the outside director’s degree of risk aversion, companies' riskiness and increasing in the outside director's ability.
Presenter Introduction：
Guoyu Lin is a PhD student in accounting from Carnegie Mellon University. He got his MA in finance, BA in economics, and BS in physics from Peking University. He has attended international meetings like 2014 AAA Annual Meeting.
presentation 20161226 Guoyu Lin xmu.pdf