Time/时间：12月2日（周五） 上午10:00-11:30
Topic/题目：Multidimensional Overconfidence and CEO Pay Duration
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Online Conference ID/腾讯会议号：761-289-285
Speaker/报告人：刘俊岐助理教授
Abstract/摘要：We examine whether the duration of CEO compensation is associated with managers’ time horizon preferences in making firm decisions. We follow the psychology literature, which shows that overconfidence manifests itself in long-term forecasts, and posit that CEO pay duration varies with the level of CEO overconfidence to counteract the undesirable effects of long-termism bias. Using management earnings forecasts issued during 2006-2017, we construct empirical measures for the overestimation, overplacement, and overprecision facets of overconfidence and find that higher CEO overprecision is associated with shorter pay duration, supporting the efficient short-termism theory. Further analyses reveal that CEO, firm, and contract characteristics moderate the relationship. Firms offering shorter pay duration to overconfident CEOs experience less undesirable outcomes, such as overinvestment and high stock return volatility, in the subsequent period.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：刘俊岐，现任厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，博士毕业于法国ESSEC商学院。其研究兴趣主要包括企业强制和自愿信息披露以及信息中介（如分析师、新闻媒体）。