Topic/题目: Board Centrality and Dividend Policy
Facilitator/主持人：Dr. Jun Ruan
Online Conference ID/腾讯会议号：218 961 439
Abstract/摘要：This paper examines the role of board well-connectedness on the dividend payout policy. The findings suggest that firms with higher board connectedness have a higher propensity to pay dividends and these firms are willing to pay more dividends compared with their less-connected counterparts. Further analysis affirms that this relation is economically stronger in firms in which the agency conflict is higher, implying that firms with higher board connectedness tend to use dividend payout as a monitoring tool. These findings remain robust after using alternate estimation methods, different board connectedness proxies, dividend payout measures, and controlling for endogeneity issues.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：Kambar Farooq is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute for Financial and Accounting Studies (IFAS), Xiamen University, PRC. He has completed an MSc in Finance from IFAS, Xiamen University, PRC, and a Bachelors in Business Administration from SZABIST, Karachi. His main research interests include Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, and Behavioral Economics.