时 间：2020 年 10 月23 日（周五）10:00-11:30
地 点：嘉庚二号楼501教室
题 目： Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from China
报告人：康少青
主持人：屈文洲 教授
报告人简介
康少青，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院博士生，厦门大学统计学学士，对外经济贸易大学金融学硕士（保送），2018年10月到2020年1月比利时鲁汶大学KU Leuven公派联合培养，目前在Accounting&Finance发表一篇文章，在Abacus即将发表一篇文章。
摘要
This paper investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders for firms’ tax-avoidance behavior, using a sample of 1,647 Chinese listed firms over the period 2004-2016. Distinguishing between state-controlled and non-state-controlled listed firms, we find that the ownership stake held by the firm’s largest shareholder is negatively associated with tax avoidance in state-controlled firms, whilst positively associated in non-state-controlled firms. The former effect proves particularly strong when the controlling shareholder is a local-level government. Next, other large non-state shareholders negatively affect tax avoidance in state-controlled firms, whereas they positively influence tax-planning practices in non-state-controlled firms. Finally, the differences in institutional quality across regions and over time influence the largest shareholder’s tendency to engage in tax avoidance only in state-controlled firms, with a better institutional environment eliciting more tax avoidance and thus curtailing minority-investor expropriation risk.