题目:   The Information Role of Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism

演讲者：强欣荣博士，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院副教授

时间:     2007年11月23日（星期五）3：00—4：30 PM    

地点:         嘉庚二513

参加者:      对会计研究有兴趣的广大师生

主持人：   邬瑜骏老师

论文摘要：

LaFond and Watts (2006) find that investors demand accounting conservatism in valuation because it reduces information asymmetry. This paper further examines whether conditional and unconditional conservatism play the same role in reducing information asymmetry and whether investors demand both in valuation. The results indicate that both types of conservatism are negatively associated with lead information asymmetry, suggesting that both can reduce information asymmetry. However, lag information asymmetry is positively

associated with conditional conservatism only, indicating that investors demand only conditional conservatism in valuation, not realizing the information role of unconditional conservatism.

论文作者简介：

强欣荣博士于清华大学获得工程学学士学位和会计学硕士学位，并于纽约州立大学获得会计学博士学位，曾在怀俄明大学任教，现为厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院副教授。强博士的研究兴趣包括赢余管理，公司治理等，已有1篇论文发表于Accounting Review。她是AAA(American Accounting Association)会员，并曾为该协会07年会的论文评审人。

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