题目: Does Managerial Stock Option Compensation Increase Shareholder Value in State-controlled Chinese Firms Listed in Hong Kong?
演讲者：Bin KE, Professor of Accounting, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University
时间: 2010年10月22日（星期五）3:00—4:30PM
地点: 嘉庚二501
参加者: 对会计研究有兴趣的广大师生
主持人： 沈哲老师
论文简介：
We test the effect of managerial stock option compensation on shareholder value in state-controlled Chinese firms that are incorporated outside China and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The grant and exercise of stock options differ significantly between Chinese firms and U.S. firms. The common shareholder value maximizing economic factors cannot explain Chinese firms’ stock option grant initiation. The stock market reactions to announcements of stock option scheme proposals are insignificant. There is no improvement in earnings performance after the stock option grant. We conclude that Chinese firms’ stock option compensation does not increase shareholder value.
论文作者简介：
Professor Ke Bin obtained his MS from Pennsylvania State University and PhD from Michigan State University. His research interests include financial reporting and disclosure, insider trading, institutional investors, financial analysts, corporate governance, and taxes. His teaching interests include financial accounting, financial statement analysis and US Federal income taxation. He has published in top journals including The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting Research and Journal of Accounting and Economics.
下载： 20101022 论文.pdf