题目: Unintended Consequences of the Independent Board Requirement on CEO Power
演讲者：Yao Lu, Assistant Professor in finance, Qinghua University
时间: 2010年12月10日（星期五）3:00—4:30PM
地点: 嘉庚二501
参加者: 对财务研究有兴趣的广大师生
主持人： 沈哲老师
论文简介：
NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors starting 2004. Since the regulation can weaken CEO influence over the board, affected CEOs may counter it by building a closely aligned team of top executives to strengthen their structural power. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find that affected CEOs fill their executive suites with significantly higher abnormal fractions of top executives hired or promoted during their tenure, and with executives with previous employment ties. This finding is not due to greater executive turnovers, confounding effects, corporate frauds, or appointing new CEOs. The accumulation of CEO power at affected firms is associated with less profitable acquisition bids and lower firm valuation. And the power increases at affected firms are observed only when they are subject to weak external governance. These findings raise the question of whether the benefits of the regulation justify its unintended consequences.
论文作者简介：
陆瑶博士现为清华大学金融系助理教授， 她分别于中央财经大学，美国纽约大学和密西根大学获得经济信息学士学位，统计-金融工程学硕士学位和商务经济学博士学位。她的主要研究领域为公司治理、公司金融、法制与金融、 资本市场改革与发展和国际资本市场。
下载：luyao_paper_120610.pdf