题目: Audit Collusion in China: A Joint Effort of Bureaucrats, Government-Appointed Firm Managers, and Local Auditors
演讲者：LIN Zhen-pin, Kenny， Associate Professor in Accounting, Lingnan University
时间: 2011年4月1日（星期五）3:00—4:30PM
地点: 嘉庚二501
参加者: 对会计研究有兴趣的广大师生
主持人： 刘振涛老师
论文简介：
Positive accounting theory posits that regulations based on accounting numbers create incentives for management to manipulate those numbers. This study examines whether managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by local governments collude with local auditors to circumvent accounting-based regulations relating to rights offerings and delisting. We infer collusion from an “improvement” in the audit opinions that companies actually received as opposed to the opinions they would have received had they used more reputable auditors. Our results suggest that audit collusion is a joint effort of bureaucrats, SOE managers, and local auditors in China.
讲座人简介：
Dr Lin taught in The Chinese University of Hong Kong and Memorial University of Newfoundland before joining Lingnan University in 2000. His research areas are China auditing and China taxation. His recent publications appear in Journal of Accounting and Economics and Review of Accounting Studies.
下载：XiamenU 2011 Version.pdf