演讲题目： The Asymmetric Information Content in Unexpected Bonus
Compensation
演讲者: Zhonglan Dai， Associate Professor of Accounting， Jindal School of
Management， University of Texas at Dallas
演讲时间：2016年12月16日（周五）上午10:00一11：30
演讲地点: 嘉庚二203
参加者：对会计、财务研究有兴趣的师生
ABSTRACT
Between two common forms of incentive compensation: cash bonus and equity grants, the boards in less risky and more certain firms would prefer bonus when they can monitor and assess their CEOs better. In the meantime, prior literature documents strong evidence that boards have tendency to shield their CEOs (especially their bonus) from poor performance. This, in turn, makes the unexpected bonus reduction informative for those firms. We study the information content embedded in the bonus compensation, especially unexpected bonus reduction, by examining its predicting power on a firm’s future. Controlling for all known factors, we find that the unexpected bonus reduction (not unexpected bonus raise) predicts both future operating performance and forced CEO turnovers. We also find that shareholders respond to the unexpected bonus reduction when the relevant compensation information becomes public. Together, our results suggest that the unexpected bonus reduction decision contains such rich private information that it helps predict future operating performance and CEO firings.