题 目：CEO Severance Pay and Corporate Tax Planning
报告人：郑祯 助理教授
主持人：张国清 教授
时 间：2017年3月28日(星期二)，15:00-17:30
地 点：厦门大学嘉庚一409室
论文摘要： We examine the association between CEO severance pay (i.e., payment the CEO would receive if s/he is involuntarily terminated) and corporate tax planning activities. We find that CEO severance pay increases corporate tax planning activities, consistent with CEO severance pay offering contractual protection against managers’ downside risk and thereby inducing managers to engage in optimal tax planning. Further, CEO severance pay provides stronger tax planning incentives in situations where we expect the downside risk protection provided by severance pay to matter more – when CEOs are otherwise more risk averse and when CEOs are more likely to bear downside risk. Finally, we find that CEO severance pay reduces firms’ cost of equity capital, suggesting that investors perceive the tax planning taken by managers to reduce agency costs and increase firm value. Overall, our results suggest that CEO severance pay provides tax planning incentives and contributes to shareholder value.