财务、会计Seminar第一百五十三期讲座

题目:Lending Relationships and the Demand for AccountingConservatism:  Theory and Evidence


演讲者:Jing Li   教授     香港大学商学院


时间:2017331日(周五)上午 1000 - 11:30


地点:嘉庚二205


主持人:郑祯   助理教授


  者:对会计、财务研究有兴趣的师生


论文简介:We examine the role of lending relationships as a determinant of  accounting conservatism for borrowers with accounting-based covenants. We  incorporate the lender's information acquisition in the incomplete contract  framework. The lender with more intense relationship is more likely to obtain  private information about the project's true states and make efficient  liquidation decisions after covenant violations. We show that the lending  relationship intensity and accounting conservatism have complementary effects on  the lender's information acquisition incentive, as well as on the borrower's  total payoff. We derive and test two predictions from the model: 1) accounting  conservatism increases with the intensity of lending relationship, and 2) the  relationship between the ex-ante loan spread  and accounting conservatism is more negative as the intensity of lending  relationship increases. Our empirical evidence is consistent with both of these  predictions.