财务、会计Seminar第一百六十七期讲座

演讲题目:Fighting Collusion through Disparity: An Experimental Investigation  of the Effect of Pay Dispersion on Collusion in Tournaments 

 

演讲者:  郭兰

Lazaridis School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier  University

 

演讲时间:2017年12月20日(周三)上午10:00一11:30

 

演讲地点:  嘉庚二208

 

主持人:  陈亚盛 教授

 

参加者:对会计、财务研究有兴趣的师生

 

讲座简介: Pay dispersion in organizations is rising and has received increasing  attention in recent years. Although prior research has documented several  negative consequences of high pay dispersion, we document one of its potential  benefits, that is, to reduce collusion between employees. We conduct an  experiment to examine the effect of pay dispersion on employee collusion. In our  experimental setting, two subordinates compete in a tournament and a superior  and the firm benefit from their effort contributions. The two subordinates can  collude by both providing a low level of effort, which increases their own  payoffs at the cost of the superior and the firm. We manipulate horizontal pay  dispersion (i.e., the ex-ante fixed wage gap between the subordinates) and  vertical pay dispersion (i.e., the ex-ante fixed wage gap between the  subordinates and their superior). Economic theory predicts that ex-ante fixed  wage differences should not affect rational subordinates’ interest in collusion.  However, based on behavioral theory, we predict and find that both horizontal  and vertical pay dispersion each individually reduce collusion by increasing  defection among subordinates. Additional data suggest that reduced cohesion and  trust between subordinates as well as their elevated desire to reduce pay  disparity underlie these results. We also find that when one type of dispersion  is present, the effect of the other type of dispersion weakens, possibly due to  the switch of pay referent from superior to subordinate or vice versa.