题 目：Corporate Hedging, Information Environment,and Stock Price Crash Risk
报告人：司 毅 助理教授
主持人：张国清 教授
时 间：2018年10月16日（星期二），15:00-17:30
地 点：嘉庚二203室
论文摘要：
This study investigates the effect of corporate hedging on stock price crash risk. We test two competing hypotheses. Under the transparency hypothesis, hedging reduces a firm’s information asymmetry and lowers crash risk. Under the opacity hypothesis, hedging decreases financial reporting quality and increases crash risk. Using a comprehensive sample of firms from 1996 to 2015, we find evidence in support of the transparency hypothesis. This result is robust to various sensitivity checks, including treatment model, difference-in-differences test, and subsample analysis. We further show that curbing bad news hoarding, curtailing overinvestment, and increasing breadth of ownership are potential channels through which hedging mitigates crash risk. Additional tests on securities class-action litigations provide consistent results.