时间：2019年5月10日（周五）15:00-16：30
地点：嘉庚二号楼501教室
题目：Real effects of governance through trading
报告人：Tae Wook KIM, Assistant Professor in Accounting, The University of Hong Kong 主持人：刘南钦，财务管理与会计研究院助理教授 |
论文摘要：
This paper investigates how disciplinary trading by informed shareholders affects the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Our theoretical model predicts that governance through trading can weaken managerial learning from prices while it mitigates the moral hazard problem, because it alters the information content of prices by impounding more information about managers’ actions but less information that is new to managers. Using institutional shareholder distraction as a shock to informed trading by large shareholders, our empirical findings support our theoretical predictions by documenting that disciplinary trading by informed shareholders decreases investment-price sensitivity. Our findings suggest that the economic consequences of governance through trading need to be carefully examined by considering the trade-off between the incentive effect and the learning effect of financial markets.
Tae Wook KIM现为香港大学助理教授，本科、硕士和博士分别毕业于韩国高丽大学、美国哈佛大学和卡耐基梅隆大学，研究兴趣为披露、盈余管理等。