时 间：2020年10月9日（周五）10:00-11:30
地 点：嘉庚二号楼501教室
题 目：How does the Market for Corporate Control Impact Tax Avoidance? Evidence from International M&A Laws
报告人：胡金帅
报告人简介
厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院副院长、厦门大学QTEM国际硕士联盟事务院长、会计学副教授、博士生导师、注册会计师、2018-2019加州大学尔湾分校（University of California, Irvine）访问学者。获厦门大学会计学硕士、香港浸会大学会计学博士学位。研究领域包括中国及国际资本市场会计研究、财务会计、财务报告、公司治理等。近年来有8篇论文在会计、财务领域国际权威学术期刊发表或接受发表，包括Journal of Accounting & Economics（1篇，会计学权威顶级期刊全球前三, SSCI收录JCR一区, 2019年影响因子3.723）、Journal of Corporate Finance（1篇，SSCI 收录JCR一区, 2019年影响因子2.521）、Emerging Markets Review（1篇，SSCI收录JCR一区，2019年影响因子3.092）、Accounting & Finance（1篇，SSCI收录JCR二区，2019年影响因子2.217）、Journal of International Accounting Research（2篇）、Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation（2篇）。
摘 要
Income taxes are a major expense for profitable corporations, oftentimes 25 percent or more of pretax income. This study exploits a setting – the market for corporate control – to test competing agency-based and risk-based explanations of corporate tax planning. Exploiting the staggered enactment of M&A laws across countries that increased the threat of takeover as an exogenous shock that allows a powerful difference-in-differences design, we find a significant reduction in tax avoidance following the takeover law passage. Our analysis suggests that reduced management private benefits consumption (i.e., rent extraction), rather than managerial effort aversion or increased risk concerns associated with aggressive tax strategies, is the likely mechanism through which takeover laws impact tax avoidance. Collectively, our findings extend the literature by highlighting the role of the corporate control market in shaping cross-sectional variation in corporate tax avoidance.