近日，厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院王荔红教授（通讯作者）与其指导的博士研究生刘婷（第一作者）、上海交通大学康少青博士后（2015级我院博士研究生）合作的论文“The externality of politically connected directors’ resignations on peers’ cost of debt”在国际知名学术期刊Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting上正式刊发。
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting为英国商学院协会ABS(AJG)三星期刊；并被我院认定为国际二类期刊。
此外，王荔红教授（通讯作者）与其指导的硕士研究生王凯（第一作者）合作的论文“Do non-controlling blockholders with common ownership monitor controlling shareholders effectively? Evidence from China”在国际知名学术期刊International Review of Finance上在线发表。
International Review of Finance被SSCI收录为JCR二区，2023年度期刊影响因子为1.8；并被我院认定为国际二类期刊。
论文1：The externality of politically connected directors’ resignations on peers’ cost of debt
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2018, we investigate the externality of the forced resignations of politically connected independent directors on the cost of debt for non-connected peers. Exploiting an exogenous shock caused by the 18th decree, we find that when politically connected independent directors resign from a Chinese listed firm, non-connected peers within the same industry experience a decrease in the cost of debt. Moreover, the sensitivity analyses further show that the above externality is more prominent in a subsample of Chinese listed non-SOEs, and in a subsample of Chinese listed firms operating in more competitive industries as well as in less developed financial markets, indicating that the externality is conditional on ownership type, industry competition and financial market development. Finally, further analyses show that peers tend to issue new debt after the political connection is disrupted. We also find that when peers have a higher creditworthiness and resignation firms have a lower creditworthiness, peers enjoy a lower cost of debt after resignations. These findings suggest that the resignations have a positive externality on peers’ cost of debt due to the elimination of preferential treatment and an improved resource allocation efficiency.
全文链接：https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11156-023-01232-6
论文2：Do non-controlling blockholders with common ownership monitor controlling shareholders effectively? Evidence from China
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007–2020, we find that non-controlling blockholders (NCBs) with common ownership can exert effective monitoring on dominant owners' self-dealing behaviors captured by financial misconducts related to controlling shareholders. This effect is concentrated among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially for the common NCBs holding only SOEs. Finally, the monitoring effect is particularly evident when firms have more peer firms, when common NCBs hold more firms within the same industry, when common NCBs exert stronger exit threats, or when common NCBs hold long investment horizons, indicating that common ownership enhances NCBs' incentives and abilities to identify and curb controlling shareholders' misbehaviors.
全文链接：https://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12463
作者简介
王荔红，应用经济学博士，教授，博士生导师。长期从事公司治理的微观企业和宏观经济效应研究，入选财政部高层次财会人才素质提升工程（中青年—学术类）、“雏鹰计划”青年拔尖人才、百千万人才工程省级人才、省高层次人才、会计人才库以及省高等学校杰出青年科研人才培育计划。出生于福建厦门，1999年9月至2003年6月厦门大学经济学院财政金融学学士毕业；2003年9月至2006年6月复旦大学世界经济研究所金融学硕士毕业；2006年9月至2011年6月比利时鲁汶大学KU Leuven商学与经济学院财务学博士毕业。2011年8月至今就职于厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院。主持国家自科和国家社科课题2项、省部级项目4项（其中省级重大项目2项，部级一般项目1项）、人才项目3项、国际课题1项和市重大课题1项，重点课题1项。作为第一或通讯作者发表论文28篇，其中22篇SSCI（JCR一区8篇，二区10篇），4篇CSSCI，Web of Science核心合集被引总数1500余次，国际国内重大会议入选60余篇次。
刘婷，我院2020级博士研究生，现为广东财经大学讲师。研究方向为公司治理，企业社会责任和ESG，研究成果发表在Applied Economics、Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting、《审计研究》等。
王凯，我院2021级硕士研究生、2024级博士研究生，研究方向为公司治理、公司财务，研究成果发表在International Review of Finance、《会计论坛》等。