Time/时间：4月25日（周五）10:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题目：Redact to benefit or Signal? Insider trading and contract redactions
Speaker/报告人： 龚昭然 西交利物浦大学国际商学院金融系助理教授
Abstract/摘要：
We investigate the information withheld through contract redaction by analyzing insider trading activities surrounding filings of redacted contracts. Using 99,541 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings—with and without redacted contracts filed between July 2008 and December 2018, we find a significant increase in both insider buying and selling around these filings. Insider buying is concentrated in the first week following the filing and is not associated with superior long-term profits, suggesting that these transactions are motivated by signaling. Consistent with this conjecture, insiders are more likely to signal when the filing is accompanied by an increased bid-ask spread or heightened price pressure; subsequently, the market reacts positively and the spread narrows.
The intensity of insider selling is strongest during the filing week and persists over the following weeks. This insider selling is associated with superior profits, particularly when the firm is more likely to have bad news.
Our study reveals that redacted contracts contain material information. Insiders signal good news through stock purchases, while profiting from bad news through insider selling.
About the Speaker/报告人简介:
龚昭然博士是西交利物浦大学国际商学院金融系的助理教授。他于香港理工大学获得博士学位。他的研究兴趣包括兼并与收购、董事会、公司治理、企业信息披露以及国际市场。他的研究成果曾在欧洲金融协会（EFA）和美国金融协会年会(AFA)等主要国际会议上展示，并在《Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis》、《Journal of Corporate Finance》和《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》等领先的会计与金融期刊上发表。他曾为《Contemporary Accounting Research》、《Journal of Corporate Finance》和《Journals of Business Ethics》等多本学术期刊担任审稿人，并且现为《Corporate Governance: An International Review》的编委会成员。