Time/时间：1月6日（周一）上午9:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
报告一
Topic/题目：Salience-induced Attention Spillover and Investors’ Response to Analyst Forecast Revisions
Speaker/报告人： 许利民高级讲师
Facilitator/主持人：李珊副教授
Abstract/摘要：
Prior research documents that salient stock returns attract investor attention and induce mispricing. We show that such attention can spill over to the analyst covering these salient stocks, shaping the information environment of non-salient stocks within the analyst’s portfolio. Specifically, we demonstrate that the market reacts strongly to analyst forecast revisions for non-salient stocks when one of the stocks they cover experiences salient returns and captures investors’ attention. However, analysts subject to such attention spillovers are more prone to forecast errors and are more likely to issue herding forecasts. We further observe a reversal in the market’s response to these analyst revisions during the post-announcement period, suggesting that attention spillover from salient stocks induces investor overreaction. Moreover, the stronger the attention-grabbing characteristics of the salient stocks and the analyst’s revisions of those stocks, the more likely salience-induced attention spills over and amplifies the market’s reaction to analyst revisions of non-salient stocks. Several factors moderate the spillover effect, including the size of the analyst’s portfolio, the timing of the revision, and market sentiment.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：
许利民博士现任阿德莱德大学商学院高级讲师，于2014年在新加坡南洋理工大学商学院（NBS）获得金融学博士学位。他的研究领域涵盖公司金融、管理层薪酬、企业社会责任、股票崩盘风险以及员工福利等方面。许博士的研究成果发表于国际顶级会计与金融期刊，如 The Accounting Review 和 Review of Finance，以及国际知名期刊，如 Journal of Corporate Finance 和 Journal of Business Ethics。此外，他教授多门本科及研究生金融课程，并现任阿德莱德商学院金融研究生项目主任。
报告二
Topic/题目：Tied at the Top: How Common Ownership Binds Executive Mobility
Speaker/报告人： 罗娟高级讲师
Facilitator/主持人：李珊副教授
Abstract/摘要：
This paper investigates the impact of common ownership on executive mobility by examining how it limits competition in the labor market for top managers. Our difference-in-differences analysis exploiting S&P 500 index additions as exogenous shocks to common ownership provides evidence of a causal negative effect. The relationship is stronger when common owners are dedicated institutional investors and when executives have specialized skills and greater external job opportunities. We show that common owners tend to design compensation packages with longer vesting periods and higher stock option intensity to retain executives. They also vote in favor of proposals that increase option grants in future contracts. Overall, our findings suggest common ownership creates friction in the executive labor market by discouraging aggressive poaching between commonly-owned firms. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the anticompetitive effects of common ownership, highlighting its implications for competition policy in labor markets, particularly concerning c-suite executives.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：
罗娟博士现任阿德莱德大学商学院高级讲师，2013年获新加坡南洋理工大学商学院（NBS）金融学博士学位。她的研究领域包括公司治理、机构投资者、金融分析师、管理层薪酬、企业社会责任以及员工参与等。罗博士的研究成果发表在国际顶级金融与会计期刊上，如 Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Accounting and Economics 和 Review of Finance。她的论文曾在多项国际顶级会议上报告，包括 AFA Annual Meeting 和 European Finance Association Conference。罗博士的研究还受到国际知名媒体的关注与引用，如 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation、The Economist 和 The Wall Street Journal。此外，她教授多门本科及研究生金融课程，并现任阿德莱德商学院应用金融研究生项目主任。