Time/时间：10月25日（周五） 10:00-11:30
Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室
Topic/题目：Corporate Communications with Government Executive Officials: Evidence from the STOCK Act
Speaker/报告人：于止戈助理教授
Abstract/摘要：The regulation of information flow between government officials and firms is crucial in shaping corporate transparency and market dynamics. This paper investigates the impact of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, which creates an exogenous shock by restricting private communication between federal executive branch officials and firms, particularly affecting those with substantial government contracts. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms with significant government customers reduce the frequency of their management forecasts following the Act’s implementation. This reduction is most pronounced in firms where government sales are critical to operations, in those with a strong reliance on political engagement, and in competitive industries. In contrast, non-financial disclosures remain largely unaffected, and the Act’s impact on firms tied to Congress members is less significant. Additionally, firms that reduce their disclosures experience a significant increase in their implied cost of capital. These findings highlight the broader consequences of limiting access to government-sourced information, revealing how regulatory efforts to curb insider trading can unintentionally alter corporate disclosure practices and increase firm financing costs.
About the Speaker/报告人简介：
于止戈博士现为厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，博士毕业于香港大学，他的主要研究领域为政治经济学，金融经济学，和信息披露。他的工作论文在审于国际顶级刊物，独立作者论文曾获得第三届Global Initiative for Governance and Sustainability (GIGS)年会最佳论文奖。