Time/时间：10月10日（周五）10:00-11:30

Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室

Topic/题目：Politically motivated corporate tax behavior

Speaker/报告人：李皖昀助理教授

Abstract/摘要：

In this study, we examine the presence of political interference in the enforcement actions of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). We find that firms located in the voting districts of powerful politicians who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for IRS, referred to as IRS-committee politicians, display higher tax avoidance. Further analyses show that these tax avoidance practices likely involve legal tax planning rather than aggressive tax avoidance. We also document several mechanisms that incentivize political interference in IRS enforcement, including personal investments by politicians, political quid pro quo, and ideology. To establish causality, we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarters relocation and politician departure shocks that change the exposure to political power. Last, additional findings suggest an “enforcement shifting” strategy by IRS-committee politicians under which they divert tax enforcement from their own districts to others closer to IRS offices, which underscores the intricate relationship between political influence and tax enforcement practices.

About the Speaker/报告人简介：

李皖昀，现任厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，博士毕业于澳大利亚国立大学商学院。其研究兴趣主要包括财务会计，大数据与数据分析，会计信息系统。