Time/时间：4月10日（周五）10:00-11:30

Venue/地点：Room 501, Jiageng Building 2/嘉庚二号楼501教室

Topic/题目：Contracting with Partisan-Aligned CEOs

Speaker/报告人：陈慧瑕助理教授

Abstract/摘要：

Prior research shows that partisan alignment between CEOs and the U.S. president shapes corporate investment, disclosure, and accounting choices. We examine whether this alignment also affects CEO pay. We posit that partisan-aligned CEOs display not only optimism but also miscalibration—key aspects of overconfidence. Theories suggest that while CEOs’ optimism and mild miscalibration reduce the convexity of executive compensation, extreme miscalibration increases it. We find that partisan-aligned CEOs receive more convex contracts. A difference-in-differences analysis exploiting a closely contested presidential election as a shock to alignment supports this positive relation. We also find that partisan-aligned CEOs issue earnings forecasts with a narrower range, indicating miscalibration. The relation between CEOs’ partisan alignment and compensation convexity is more pronounced for more powerful CEOs and for firms with greater investment opportunities or operating in riskier industries. Overall, the evidence suggests that miscalibration dominates among partisan-aligned CEOs, and firms respond by offering more convex compensation contracts.

About the Speaker/报告人简介：

陈慧瑕，现任厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院助理教授，博士毕业于香港城市大学与中国人民大学。其研究兴趣主要包括研发会计、高管薪酬与行为会计。