报告人：Siqi Li, associate professor in accounting, Santa Clara University, US
We investigate the effect of fair value accounting on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation contracts. Our analysis uses a shock-based difference-in-differences research design that exploits the 2005 worldwide mandatory adoption of IFRS, and employs a firm-level measure of the fair value treatment effect. We find that earnings pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) declines among the IFRS adopters that are most affected by IFRS’s fair value provisions relative to the IFRS adopters that are least affected by its fair value provision. Our findings are consistent with the notion that IFRS, on average, improves the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation contracts, but that its fair value provisions offset this improvement. These results are robust for industrial firms but hold only weakly for financial firms. We further find that the results are primarily driven by firms in countries with strong enforcement, and that increased earnings management, rather than increased earnings volatility, is the most likely channel through which fair value accounting impairs earnings PPS. Our findings contribute to the literature on the contracting usefulness of fair value accounting by presenting evidence that suggests fair value accounting impairs the usefulness of earnings in compensation contracts.
黎思琦博士现为美国Santa Clara University会计学副教授，于美国南加州大学获得会计学博士学位，已在Contemporary Accounting Research和The Accounting Review等国际顶级学术期刊发表多篇论文。