报告人：Yun Zhang, associate professor in accounting, George Washington University, USA
We analytically examine how investors.information processing costs and mandatory disclosure quality affect disclosure effectiveness. We model disclosure effectiveness as a joint product of firms.communication efforts and investors.attention efforts. The objective of communication efforts is to improve disclosure clarity so that investors can fully utilize information in mandatory reports if they exert attention efforts. We find that mandatory disclosure can either encourage or discourage firms to engage in communication efforts, depending on the characteristics of the underlying activities. For activities where firm-specific factors matter more, more accurate mandatory disclosure can discourage useful communication efforts, resulting in lower equilibrium use of information by investors and lower investment efficiency. The opposite is true for activities where firm-specific factors matter less. We discuss the empirical and policy implications of our analyses.
Yun Zhang博士现为美国George Washington University会计学副教授，于美国耶鲁大学获得博士学位，已在Contemporary Accounting Research和The Accounting Review等国际顶级学术期刊发表多篇论文。