报告人：Wei Lu，Senior Lecturer in Accounting, Monash University， Australia
Beginning January 1, 2012, all publicly listed companies in China are required, under the Basic Standard of Enterprise Internal Control (China SOX), to provide an internal control report (ICR). Prior to that, many companies had elected to voluntarily comply with this regulation. This paper documents the difference in companies’ disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) under both a voluntary and mandatory disclosure regime. We find evidence suggesting that the number and quality of disclosure of ICWs improve when the filings are required as compared to when the filings are made on a voluntary basis. Evidence of this improved quality is shown by the disclosure of a greater quantity of serious and major ICWs. We attribute this improvement in quality to the enhanced information quality and environment for internal control reporting when filings are required.
We also investigate the effect of ICW disclosures on the accuracy and dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts. We find that various measures of ICWs are negatively associated with the quality of analyst earnings forecasts; we also find an overall improvement in the relationship between ICW disclosure and forecast quality on the accuracy and dispersion in the mandatory regime.
Lu Wei 博士现为澳大利亚莫纳什大学会计学高级讲师，在澳大利亚拉筹伯大学获得会计学博士学位和经济学硕士学位，曾在The International Journal of Accounting、Abacus、Managerial Auditing Journal等国际知名学术期刊发表多篇论文。